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The earliest historical reference to hawala is in Egyptian records over 
a millennium old, where it signified an 
‘exchange of debt’ between those provid-
ing financial services to long distance 
traders. These financial service provid-
ers, or ‘hawaladars’, formed a coalition 
of reciprocity that routinely honoured 
each other’s ‘hundi’ – bills of exchange, 
using conventional banking terminol-
ogy. To long distance traders, hawala 
were useful because a hundi could be 
cashed by a coalition hawaladar in any 
other market. The encashment of hun-
dis generated a complex network of debt 
that was ultimately settled in a series of 
‘debt swaps’ – ‘hawala’. After European 
powers established hegemony over the 
Indian Ocean, western banking houses 
dominated and hawala were marginal-
ised. They were rejuvenated after colo-
nial power collapsed, migrant popula-
tions increased and communication 
technology evolved. Hawaladars found 
themselves perfectly suited to the logis-
tical challenge of delivering ‘migrant 
remittances’: money sent by migrants 
to family members in their home coun-
tries.1
A modernised version of hawala was 
playing a significant role in financial 
transactions throughout the Islamic 
world well before 9/11. Used by migrant 
workers of Muslim origin as a cheap 
and convenient means of sending 
savings to their families back home, 
‘hawaladars’ are found at the heart of 
virtually every community established 
by Asian migrant workers in Europe, 
North America and the oil-rich Middle 
East. Equipped with little more than a 
telephone, computer and fax machine 
– often in the corner of an inner-city 
store selling anything from cheap tick-
ets to groceries to a largely migrant cli-
entele – hawaladars guarantee delivery 
to recipients within 48 hours, no matter 
how remote the destination, at a frac-
tion of the cost charged by formally 
constituted agencies such as Western 
Union, and to a far wider range of des-
tinations. Cash deliveries to remote val-
leys in the Pir Panjal, to the mountains 
of the North West Frontier Province, 
to war-torn Afghanistan and Somalia 
are all routine. A similar system used 
by Chinese migrants is called fei-chien, 
‘flying money’ – an apt description of 
hawala’s wonders.
 
Terrorist finance?
Hawala is big business: millions of dol-
lars a day flow through the system glo-
bally. Prior to 9/11 few outsiders were 
aware of the system; after 9/11 suspicion 
of all things Islamic suddenly labelled 
hawala a form of ‘underground bank-
ing’. But this is clearly banking with a 
difference. For those accustomed to the 
clerical procedures of formally consti-
tuted banks and their mounds of docu-
mentation – cheques, deposit receipts, 
account statements, transaction sum-
maries – hawala operations appear to 
operate on an impossibly casual basis 
open to exploitation by terrorists and 
other malefactors. 
Hawala is indeed an ‘informal’ sys-
tem by contemporary Euro-American 
standards. Relying wherever possible 
on trust rather than written contracts 
to guarantee the security of their trans-
actions, and transmitting only the data 
necessary to complete them, hawala-
dars deploy conventional banking pro-
cedures of consolidation, settlement 
and deconsolidation, but reduce record-
keeping to a bare minimum. This ‘lean 
and mean’ approach dramatically reduc-
es overheads and cost per transaction. It 
also alarms regulators: such operations 
appear to be un-auditable by conven-
tional standards. During the post-9/11 
panic, hawala was routinely described 
as ‘a system without records’. 
Much of that was hype. Careful inspec-
tion reveals that hawaladars do keep 
essential records – amounts delivered, 
recipient names and addresses – with-
out which they could not run their oper-
ations. But these front-office practices 
were not what stumped outside observ-
ers; it was their back-office procedures 
culminating in cash deliveries to remote 
locations that remained shrouded in 
mystery. Sending funds overseas by 
conventional means is normally com-
plex, which is why banks charge sub-
stantial commissions. How could ‘back-
street’ hawaladars achieve the same end 
so much more cheaply? Many sceptical 
observers smelled a rat.
While the American military rounded up 
‘illegitimate combatants’ the world over, 
the US Treasury Department took aim 
at illegitimate financial networks sus-
pected of supporting terrorists. When 
the American embassies in Nairobi and 
Dar es Salaam were bombed three years 
earlier, the US alleged that al-Qaida 
operatives had received funds through 
local hawaladars. On the grounds that 
those responsible for the 9/11 atrocities 
must have done the same, American 
authorities soon found a target: the al-
Barakaat network, the principal means 
through which members of the Somali 
diaspora supported their kinsfolk back 
home. The network was promptly shut 
down and all its assets confiscated, 
despite vociferous protests that al-Bar-
akaat had a legitimate function and 
that the cash remitted by émigrés had 
kept the entire Somali economy afloat 
for the past decade. Suggestions that al-
Barakaat was the underground banking 
arm of al-Qaida turned out to be largely 
specious. The 9/11 Commission con-
cluded most funds used to finance the 
Twin Towers operation were channelled 
through the Suntrust Bank in Venice, 
Florida, where two of the perpetrators 
had opened a conventional account.2
Know your customer
In the heated post-9/11 political climate, 
lack of evidence did not preclude taking 
action. Within six months Congress 
passed the Patriot Act, fully entitled: 
Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. Among 
its draconian measures was requiring 
all US-based financial institutions to 
comply with the reinforced Anti-Money 
Laundering and Countering Terrorist 
Finance (AML/CFT) regulations prom-
ulgated by the US-sponsored Finan-
cial Crimes Enforcement Network. 
In addition to monitoring individual 
customer transactions, these regula-
tions also required American financial 
institutions to ensure that the financial 
institutions with which the former did 
business – including those operating 
elsewhere in the world – complied with 
AML/CFT requirements.3 Thus Ameri-
can war-on-terror strategists aimed not 
only to detect and sweep up terrorists 
wherever they might be hiding, but 
to perform a similar operation with 
respect to suspect financial flows. Given 
the status of the dollar as the globally-
preferred unit of exchange, no major 
financial institution in the world could 
afford to ignore the new provisions if 
they wanted to continue routing trans-
actions through New York’s markets 
– as they had to in order to stay in busi-
ness.4 The American Treasury clearly 
felt it had the enemy cornered.
The Patriot Act also imposed ‘Know 
Your Customer’ (KYC) regulations, 
which required all financial institutions 
to perform criminal background checks 
of all customers and to ensure funds 
deposited were ‘clean’. KYC non-com-
pliance could lead to multi-million-dol-
lar fines. The Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network’s main objective was to 
firewall the global financial system. If 
all institutions complied with its new 
requirements, of which KYC was the 
key, criminally acquired funds would be 
unable to penetrate the legitimate finan-
cial marketplace. ‘Clean’ money would 
circulate freely, while ‘dirty’ money 
generated by drug smugglers, crimi-
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nals and terrorists would stagnate out-
side the firewall and, theoretically, get 
mopped up by authorities.5 In principle, 
the new regulations did not ban hawala 
networks. They simply demanded con-
formity to AML/CFT, KYC and other 
financial services industry regulations. 
Hence American authorities have had 
great success closing down ‘terror-
ist’ networks in breach of regulatory 
requirements. Many European govern-
ments took the same sceptical view of 
hawala networks.6
At first these initiatives appeared to 
have the desired effect. Faced with the 
possible seizure of informal sector 
transfers, many migrants switched to 
the more expensive services of formally 
constituted banks and Western Union 
to send money home. The results were 
spectacular: in Pakistan, for example, 
the formally recorded annual inflow of 
migrant remittances rose from US$1.1 
billion in 2001 to US$4.2 billion in 
2004.7 Since then, however, formal 
channel inflow has slackened and no 
evidence suggests the end of informal 
networks. The World Bank’s 2005 esti-
mates suggest the annual global flow 
of migrant remittances through formal 
channels exceeded $233 billion world-
wide, of which developing countries 
received $167 billion. Unrecorded flows 
are conservatively estimated at 50% of 
worldwide recorded flows.8
Informal value transfer systems – of 
which hawala is one – are still very 
much in business. Wherever possible 
they adjust their practices (or how they 
represent them) to comply with AML/
CFT regulations. They take advantage 
of local variations, given that countries 
interpret AML requirements differ-
ently. In Britain, for example, customs 
inspectors have confined their atten-
tion to front-office KYC compliance9 
in keeping with the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network’s ‘firewall’ pol-
icy; inspectors rarely, if ever, consider 
the back-office procedures of those 
engaged in trans-national and trans-
currency transmission and as a result 
most hawaladars have registered them-
selves as licensed Money Service Busi-
nesses. Meanwhile, in France, Germany 
and the Netherlands, those seeking to 
operate such businesses are required to 
register as banks, with all the associated 
regulatory consequences. Nevertheless, 
hawaladars have managed to keep their 
heads well below the parapet. The Patri-
ot Act has not killed off hawala; adjust-
ing to local circumstances, the opera-
tion is thriving. 
From swapping debts to 
swapping data 
Post-9/11 paranoia spawned conspiracy 
theories about how hawala enables 
criminals, drug smugglers and terror-
ists to run wild. Before jumping to such 
conclusions, it is worth examining the 
evidence. Do the excellent terms hawala-
dars offer migrant workers really result 
from large premiums criminals and ter-
rorists pay to get their hands on ‘clean’ 
dollars? Or have hawaladars simply 
devised a highly efficient means of long-
distance value transfers with which for-
mal institutions cannot compete? From 
their customers’ perspective, the most 
attractive dimension of hawala-style 
delivery systems is their capacity to pro-
vide financial services swiftly and at a 
fraction of the cost charged by Western 
Union or Travelex. Customers deposit-
ing cash in any one country and curren-
cy can expect a sum of similar value in 
local currency to reach its destination in 
another country within 48 hours. 
How do hawaladars do it? The effi-
ciency of their back-office procedures 
incur overhead costs dramatically lower 
than those of formal sector rivals. These 
costs have two major components. The 
first is the cost of moving raw cash 
from place to place, which all financial 
operators, including hawaladars, seek 
to reduce by turning cash into value: 
financial instruments that can be con-
solidated, traded and de-consolidated 
at will. While information is transmit-
ted far more cheaply than cash, infor-
mation processing also costs money: 
this is the second source of overheads. 
Hawaladars, like banks, still sometimes 
find it necessary to physically transfer 
currency notes among themselves. But 
just as in the formal banking sector, the 
greater part of hawala is conducted at 
a more abstract level, since it involves 
the transfer of value rather than of cash 
from one location to another. The more 
efficiently these transfers can be imple-
mented, the lower the overheads. 
The implementation of value transmis-
sion is not a matter of physical logis-
tics, but rather of the transmission and 
processing of information – which is 
one reason why recent developments 
in communications technology have 
had such far-reaching impact on the 
global financial services industry. In a 
comprehensively wired world, data can 
Within days of the 9/11 attacks, American authorities prepared to wage war on terror on both 
financial and military fronts. As the Taliban fled Kabul in the face of advancing American forces, 
US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill announced he was forging a global alliance through which ‘we 
are going to pursue the financiers of terrorism like they’ve never been pursued before.’ His target, 
however, was as shadowy as al-Qaida itself: the informal system of international money transfer 
known as hawala. 
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be instantly transmitted to anyone with 
access to a telephone, whether a land-
line, mobile phone or satellite link. 
Hawaladars owe their competitiveness 
to marrying their ancient commercial 
art with modern communications tech-
nology. 
Most migrants rarely remit sums of 
more than a few hundred dollars at a 
time. They demand  recipients receive 
cash deliveries swiftly and reliably, even 
if they live in remote villages. For for-
mal sector banks, meeting the demands 
of such customers is extremely chal-
lenging. Their procedures are cumber-
some and overheads substantial: their 
migrant customers frequently find 
that between 15 and 20% of their hard-
earned cash disappears in transfer and 
delivery costs. While hawaladars use 
conventional consolidation, settlement 
and deconsolidation, they substitute 
mainstream banks’ expensive formal 
procedures with ‘informal’ reciproci-
ties of trust and by using a distributed 
system of information-exchange (rather 
than storing masses of data in expen-
sive central registries) to implement 
long-distance value transfers. Because 
hawaladars fulfil migrants’ financial 
services requirements far more cheaply, 
migrants flock to them.
Trust
Whilst hawala and other similarly con-
stituted value transfer networks are 
commonly identified as ‘informal’, they 
are anything but small-scale. In Dubai, 
the hub of contemporary global hawala 
networks, multi-million-dollar trans-
fer-settlements are brokered every day 
using IT facilities and financial meth-
ods no different from those deployed 
by formal rivals. What is different is 
the virtually cost-free coalition of trust 
binding all participating hawaladars 
together within an alliance that main-
tains system security10 and allows 
bewilderingly complex transactions. 
Dubai mega-deals can involve multiple 
tranches of £100,000 assembled by a 
‘consolidating hawaladar’ operating at a 
national level. This is where the physical 
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Transactions precipitated by a Britain/Pakistan exchange of debt between two consolidating hawaladars
dimensions of hawala – including the 
physical transfer of currency notes – are 
more easily grasped by the uninitiated. 
Consider the sketch below, a simplified 
illustration of how two parallel sets of 
consolidation and deconsolidation in 
Britain and Pakistan and a back-to-back 
swap of value between consolidating 
hawaladars can facilitate the transfer of 
funds from Pakistani settlers in Britain 
to their kinsfolk in Pakistan. 
The core of the operation, executed on 
a daily basis, is an agreement between 
two hawaladars to swap tranches of cash 
of the same value, say, one in pounds 
sterling and the other in Pakistani 
rupees, as a means of implementing a 
multitude of smaller deals on behalf of 
their respective clients.11 For example, 
assuming £1 equals 100 rupees, if a 
Britain-based hawaladar consolidates 
£100,000 from numerous Britain-
based Pakistanis sending small sums 
back to family members in northern 
Pakistan, and his Karachi-based part-
ner hawaladar accumulates 10 million 
rupees from local businessmen seeking 
to settle £100,000 of invoices from Brit-
ish suppliers, the two can do a straight-
forward swap: the Britain-based hawala-
dar physically transfers £100,000 in 
cash to the Pakistan-based hawaladar’s 
representative in Britain, while a paral-
lel transfer of 10 million rupees takes 
place in Karachi and the bank notes are 
delivered to the northern villages where 
migrant workers’ relatives live. 
 
As the diagramme illustrates, many 
actors are involved in such a deal. The 
tranches of value that the two con-
solidating hawaladars swap are almost 
always a product of many independent-
ly brokered deals and sub-deals nego-
tiated by each hawaladar’s agents and 
sub-agents. Networks even more com-
plex than the kind shown below ‘pulse’ 
on a daily basis. In essence, each deal 
is a transnational swap not so much of 
cash but of information between the two 
consolidating hawaladars – information 
that promptly generates two matched, 
simultaneous and local flows of hard 
cash: one flows in pounds down the 
left side of the diagramme, the other 
in Pakistani rupees up the right. Both 
movements of cash take place within 
the system’s back-office dimension and 
lead to a steady deconsolidation of the 
transnational value that culminates 
when cash reaches hawaladars whose 
front-office procedures hand cash over 
to the ultimate recipients. To the end 
recipient, value transmitted from else-
where is transformed as if by magic into 
cash in hand or in their bank accounts. 
Should we be alarmed? 
Could such networks provide a financial 
haven for terrorists and drug smugglers? 
We know huge sums of dirty money reg-
ularly flow through the formal banking 
system, regardless of AML/CFT require-
ments.12 Informal systems are open to 
similar forms of malfeasance, but does 
it actually happen? If so, on what scale? 
Conspiracy theorists, uninterested in 
exploring how hawala networks actu-
ally operate, bemused by suggestions 
that they constitute a highly effective 
entrepreneurial initiative in the increas-
ingly competitive global marketplace for 
financial services, leap for easy answers. 
For example, the Financial Action Task 
Force website unequivocally asserts 
that cash delivery of the kind shown in 
the bottom left-hand quadrant of the 
diagramme is prima facie evidence of 
money laundering and a classic case 
of ‘cuckoo smurfing’ – the transfer of 
criminal funds through the accounts of 
unsuspecting persons.13 No other pos-
sibilities are considered. 
This is not to suggest that money 
launderers do not or cannot exploit 
hawala networks. Some of those 
tranches of  US$100,000 could 
indeed come from a heroin sale. But 
no matter how great the profits of 
international drug-smuggling, they 
are dwarfed by the scale of migrant 
remittances. And is it likely that Brit-
ain-based drug smugglers shelter 
their profits in Pakistani rupees? All 
serious commentators agree smug-
glers prefer US dollars in formally 
constituted banks located in well-
sheltered Caribbean jurisdictions. 
That said, one cannot exclude the possi-
bility that criminals, terrorists and drug 
smugglers will take advantage of those 
jurisdictions where no formally consti-
tuted banks currently operate. In Soma-
lia and Afghanistan, for example, finan-
cial transactions of all kinds, from the 
most innocent to the most criminal, can 
indeed pass through hawala networks. 
In more normal circumstances, how-
ever, hawaladars have a direct interest 
in avoiding criminal activity. Coalitions 
of absolute trust depend on the reliabil-
ity of their members and everyone their 
members do business with. Violated 
trust imperils the stability of the whole 
coalition and invites severe sanctions. 
Precisely because hawaladars expect to 
maintain a personal relationship with 
their customers, especially those with 
whom they engage in large-scale trans-
actions, they effectively maintain their 
own ‘know your customer’ scheme. 
They also have a personal interest in 
excluding dodgy dealers: failure to do 
so imperils their position within the 
coalition. 
Nobody denies the need for authorities 
to do everything in their legal power 
to contain the activities of terrorism’s 
financiers and drug traffickers, but so 
far the results have not been impres-
sive. It’s easy to impound cash passing 
through hawala networks and claim suc-
cess in destroying the financial sinews 
of terrorist and drug-smuggling opera-
tions. But if neither terrorists nor drug-
smugglers are apprehended, if heroin 
becomes so plentiful that its street price 
declines, shaking down hawalas looks 
more like a public relations exercise.
If my analysis is correct, most transac-
tions routed through hawala networks 
are wholly legitimate and offer a finan-
cial lifeline to millions of migrant work-
ers needing a cheap and reliable means 
of sending money back home. The 
authorities are correct in believing that 
some ‘dirty money’ lies concealed with-
in the huge sums flowing through the 
hands of hawaladars, as is the case with-
in the mainstream banking system. The 
challenge is to find an effective means 
of separating the sheep from the goats. 
But authorities appear to have issued 
those who guard the gates of financial 
rectitude with blunderbusses rather 
than stilettos – their efforts cause con-
siderable collateral damage. Meanwhile, 
the goats continue to slip by undetected 
and are becoming more skilled at evad-
ing surveillance.
The authorities’ chances of success 
would have been greater had they for-
mulated their strategies with a better 
appreciation of the character, location 
and modus operandi of their targets. 
Merely driving the system underground 
– the currently preferred tactic – favours 
criminals much more than their pur-
suers, given that the ultimate targets 
are the terrorists and drug smugglers 
behind those alleged to be providing 
them with financial services. Rather 
than succumbing to panic, might not 
the authorities make greater progress if 
they sought the co-operation of hawala-
dars instead of subjecting them to ran-
dom prosecution on specious grounds? 
If some ‘dirty money’ passes through 
the system, nobody is better placed than 
hawaladars to guide investigators to its 
source. But there is little chance of their 
volunteering such information if their 
normal commercial business places 
them in constant danger of arrest. <
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